The short paper presents interesting discussions related to specific Indonesian legislative election system. We build algorithmic steps in computational geometry that employ the basic patterns that emerged from the legal decisions of Indonesian General Election Commission about the election district. Some interesting facts are observed and tried to be analyzed and concerning them to the democratization processes in the country. The further implementation of the model can be utilized as a tool to see the patterns of optimizations for the beneficial of particular parties, to evaluate the election results, and to see the relatedness of the legally-decided configurations of election district in Indonesia.
Intro
Indonesia is learning to be democratic. This can be seen from many changes in cultural aspects in the political realm of the people. One aspect that easy to see the democracy is the practical aspects of the general elections with which citizens can give their votes on preferred leaders and representatives that would bring the whole nations in the incoming service year under the constitution.
Some statistical aspects of Indonesian democratic features have been discussed previously in Situngkir & Surya (2004) . This work brings the macroproperties of the resulting legislative election 2004 to the observation and also has been confirmed in some other countries. The present paper delivers a more microview of the legislative elections by zooming the electoral processes in an administrative district/area. In the meso-level of legislative election (2004) , one of important and sometimes crucial issues to be discussed are about the electoral district 1 . However, the configuration of the electoral districts, can yield distinct results in the elections practically and some hypotheses regarding to this would be the theme of our discussions in the rest of the paper.
Electoral District in Indonesia's Election
Countries have historical background of its own, governmental systems, and various population densities including the distinctive ethnic groups. This, we suppose, becomes the source of the variations of electoral systems across countries in the world. IIDEA (2005) divides electoral system into 4 different types. Every main class can also be distinguished into some sub-classes. We may refer it to table 1. For instance, the legislative election in United States uses the First Past The Post System while Japan use the Parallel System. In advance, apparently the electoral system not only varied across nations but also have dynamics respect to the political changes within countries. • First Past The Post.
• The TwoRound
System. • The Alternative Vote.
• Block Vote.
• Party Block Vote.
• Parallel Systems.
• Mixed Member Proportional.
• List Proportional Representation.
• Single Transferable Vote.
• The Single Non Transferable Vote.
As a specific case, Indonesia's electoral system is interesting to be observed. Indonesia has the fourth largest populations on earth after China, India, and the United States. More interestingly, the population is made by more than 100 ethnic groups spreading in islands of thousand existing ones, yet more than half of the population lives in a single island, Java. This fact bestows a sophisticated challenge to 
Model: Electoral Localized Trees are Assorted
The patterns depicted in latest part of the previous section, somehow, would have left questions to any political analysts about the possible variations and configurations of the electoral districts, especially those which are in the provinces with largest population. Obviously there are particular configurations of electoral districts that could possibly made certain parties to gain more chairs in the house while other configurations could also made them loosing votes as residue for they cannot fulfill enough quota for a chair. In the other cases, different numbers of chairs representing an electoral district could also give different result of the gaining in the tally. Our model would first transform the geographical map as shown in figure 1 into the nodes and edges where edges represent the neighbors surrounding the corresponding municipalities denoted by vertex. Hence, the edge ij e shows that in the geographical map, both vertex i and j are neighbors each other. Thus, the connectivity of the vertexes is becoming our references to draw the tessellations of As shown in figure 2, the data structure of an electoral district has direct boundaries with one another can be viewed as graph or a tree-like mathematical structure. Here, be it a graph or a data structure are equivalent since the tree-like data structure contains not only a set of elements but also connections between elements, giving a tree-like graph.
From the first pattern in the 2004 general election, we build an algorithm to have one single electoral district as the tree of municipalities as represented by the vertex and to which geographical boundaries exist as edges. This is similar to the updating rule of Cayley tree (cf. Bergeron, et. al., 1998: 284) . Thus, we would have possibly several trees acting as electoral districts ruled by the assumptions of the value of i D and the graph of municipalities' geographical boundaries as shown in figure 2 . A test of our algorithm is applied to the Voronoi Diagram (constructed with the similar two-patterns) as shown in figure 3 . The algorithm we used can be summarized as follows:
From the algorithm above, apparently that not all of the running processes would eventually come up with complete series of electoral districts. There would always be a running processes from the randomized initial point of municipality that in the end returning a tree with
In this case, the whole algorithm would be restarted. The Partai Golkar 3 and the PDI-Perjuangan 4 are the winning two parties in almost all regions of Indonesia in the election of 2004. As we can see in any configurations and sizes of electoral district, both parties performed very well relative to other parties. However, as we scrutinize the simulation result in figure 5, apparently for both parties big sizes (shown in more right-sided in the figure) of electoral districts are not really beneficial for the gaining legislative chairs. This is relative to the three presented parties (Partai Demokrat 5 , Partai Amanat Nasional 6 , and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 7 ). These three parties perform well to gaining the legislative chairs as the sizes of the electoral district become larger. This however, makes sense; since the latter three are relatively small parties and their constituencies are not uniformly distributed in the population on all administrative districts. Thus, as the electoral district was made smaller, more of their votes would be a residue and cannot be regarded as legislative chairs. We believe that this is the tricky part of the electoral system that is used in Indonesia. A relatively smaller political parties would have craved for smaller parties by sounding the issue of the closeness of candidates to their constituencies, while 3 Partai Golkar or Golkar Party is the reformed Golongan Karya. 
Dis
big parties would have become easier gaining legislative chair as bigger electoral district used. As we see in figure 5 , there at the similar size of electoral districts, in few configurations (indexed at 43th and 59th), the political party PAN is performing better relative to their performance compared also with other parties. Here, our hypothesis is visually seen that some methods can also be developed in the future to compute better gaining votes in Indonesian general election for specific political parties based on their historical performance.
Other interesting features can also be seen from our observation as shown in figure  6 . PKB 8 is the winner in our focus province and there is similar voter's profile brought by both parties. In this figure, we do not only observe the average numbers of legislative chairs but also see the spreading of them in the variable of the maximum and minimum legislative chairs the political parties gained. From figure 6, as we see the struggles of the two Islamic parties, in all of the possible sizes of electoral districts PKB hold the winning theme, but interestingly, in some cases, PPP 9 as the smaller party have possibilities to steal some votes as the sizes of the districts are made smaller: some configurations can even almost double the gain of legislative chairs.
Thus, the uncertainty of legislative election is bigger as the sizes of the electoral districts are smaller, this is shown by the interesting fact that:
-Smaller parties can steal votes since the smaller the size of the district, the more they can save the votes that on average can be regarded just as residue. -Smaller sizes of the electoral districts, bigger the possible configurations of the districts and it has been showed that several of the combinations can significantly be beneficial for the gained legislative chair.
Concluding Remarks
We have built algorithm to check some hypothetical propositions regarding the issues on legislative electoral districts. We formalize algorithmically the two patterns of the electoral districts' configurations, namely the fact that electoral districts are always configured within provinces (and or lower administrative districts) and another fact that electoral districts are always coalesced by neighboring administrative districts.
From those basic assumptions and some interpretations of the election law along with processing the 2004 results and the population data in Eastern Java, we have observed some interesting features from the legislative election 2004. From the simulation we showed that there exist some configurations of electoral districts significantly beneficial to some political parties. Larger parties would prefer larger sized electoral districts so that they can beat the smaller parties whose total votes would always be able to be undermined. However, the democratization processes demand the close relationship between the representatives and the constituents that in one way can be reflected by smaller sized electoral districts. The latter would be beneficial very much to smaller parties since it opened their ways and access to gain legislative chairs.
